Double Trouble for the Maldives: Caught between Rising Seas and Rising Powers

By Vrinda Malik

Abstract
The Maldives is among the nations worst hit by climate change, experiencing rising sea levels, flooding, coastal erosion, and water scarcity. The already environmentally vulnerable state is also in a predicament due to its strategic location and role in the strategic calculus of Asian giants India and China, which are rapidly trying to increase their sea power in the Indian Ocean. This article argues that the Maldives faces a double-trouble situation. On the one hand, it is facing a climate emergency; on the other, it is facing an increasing threat of falling under external pressure and losing its policy autonomy and independent decision-making powers. It is essential to analyse the impact of the climate crisis and geopolitical competition together, as they are interconnected.

Keywords: climate change; Indian Ocean geopolitics; small island states; geopolitical competition

The Maldives is an archipelago nation in the Indian Ocean. It consists of around 1,192 coral islands grouped in 26 atolls, of which around 185 islands are inhabited. Its territory is 99 percent water with one of the world’s most dispersed landmasses. The Maldives’ economy is mainly dependent on tourism, fishing, and some agriculture. It is a Small Island Developing State (SIDS) struggling to survive amid climate shocks and mounting external debt.

“The projects are presented as development or connectivity initiatives, yet they serve dual purposes: enhancing climate resilience while simultaneously embedding strategic influence.“

According to the World Bank Group (2024), its existence is increasingly under threat; it is likely to disappear beneath the ocean at some point in the future due to sea-level rise, making it acutely vulnerable to the climate crisis. However, it holds strategic importance due to its location. Over 80% of trade to and from Asia passes through its territory (Lim & Mukherjee, 2019). This importance adds to its vulnerability to external influences and interventions, putting it in a double-trouble situation. These two realities are often analyzed separately: one as an environmental crisis, the other as a geopolitical challenge.

However, these realities are deeply interconnected. Analyzing them in isolation obscures the gravity of the problem the Maldives faces. The climate crisis generates high costs for climate infrastructure and recovery, compelling the Maldives to rely on external financing, much of which is provided by major powers with strategic interests in the region. As a result, climate adaptation and financing for infrastructure projects become a pathway through which geopolitical influence can be exercised.

Climate Emergency on the Horizon

At present, the main problem is water; the Northern islands face drinking water shortages from April to May, whereas the Southern islands face the problem of flooding (UNDP Climate, 2017). In 2024, the Maldives saw an increase in disaster incidents by 37%, mainly driven by flooding incidents. A total of 251 incidents were recorded across 20 atolls in 2024, which had increased from 183 in 2023 and 144 in 2022 (Shahid, 2025). Between 1992 and 2015, annual sea level rise averaged just under 4 mm. There is a high probability that the rate could increase to between 6 and 12 mm per year in situations of extreme warming, potentially leading to a rise of anywhere from 0.5 to 0.9 m by 2100 (World Bank Group, 2024, p. 6). Indeed, in the past, the Maldivian islands have adapted to sea-level rise naturally, but climate change impacts make their future natural adaptation potential highly uncertain. The country faces issues including rising sea levels, flooding, coastal erosion, extreme weather conditions, and increased coral bleaching events. The situation is grim. Around 80 percent of the landmass is situated less than 1 m above mean sea level, and over 40 percent of the population lives within 100 m of the coastline, making its population vulnerable to the consequences of rising sea levels, flooding, and coastal erosion (World Bank Group, 2024).

This situation has created urgent need for investment in water and sanitation projects, artificial island development, land reclamation, and post-disaster recovery. However, the Maldives has limited economic and resource capacity for handling climate adaptation and recovery efforts. It depends on adequate and effective international support to implement climate action and offset climate risk (Ministry of Tourism and Environment, 2025). This dependence has trapped the Maldives in a vicious cycle: financing climate infrastructure and recovery efforts leads to debt accumulation, compounding the fiscal pressure created by repeated climate shocks and other external shocks (Mani, 2025). The country’s total guaranteed debt stood at $8.2 billion, equivalent to 116% of GDP, in the first quarter of 2024. About half of this is external debt, with a substantial share owed to China ($1.37 billion) and India ($124 million) in loans (Dickie & Strohecker, 2024). It is within this context that we need to analyze the geopolitical competition.

Geopolitical Competition and Strategic Dependence

India and China are constantly competing for sea power, and the Maldives has become a focal point of the competition. Both powers seek to woo island states by aiding and supporting them in various capacities. India seeks to safeguard its dominance in the Indian Ocean Region and counter China’s rise, while China is pushing to increase its influence and dominate the region (Brewster, 2018). Since 2010, both countries have taken great interest in the Maldives and invested in Maldivian infrastructure, development projects, and political partnerships.

China has heavily invested in the capital city of Malé and the island of Hulhumalé. The two most important projects have been the expansion of the Velana International Airport in Malé and the construction of the Sinamalé bridge (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2020). It has also provided grants for renewable energy-powered microgrid seawater desalination plants on the five Maldivian islands of Kaashidhoo, Kurendhoo, Alifushi, Kelaa, and Dhaandhoo (Shihab, 2024). India, meanwhile, has aided water and sanitation projects in 28 islands, brought safe drinking water to 32 islands, and introduced a sewerage system in 17 islands. With total funding of USD 110 million, this is the largest climate adaptation project implemented in the Maldives with international collaboration (Ministry of External Affairs, 2024). In 2025, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a $565-million credit line and initiated free trade talks with the Maldives (Patel & Jayasinghe, 2025).

These investments provide much-needed capital, but they also create strategic dependencies. The projects are presented as development or connectivity initiatives, yet they serve dual purposes: enhancing climate resilience while simultaneously embedding strategic influence. The heavy investments in ports, airports, and urban infrastructure create overdependence on international support, in this case on China and India, which can constrain foreign policy autonomy in the long run. In the last two decades, the Maldives opted to hold a middle position without choosing sides; however, with growing dependence, it is facing pressure from both sides.

The Maldives: A Critical Case among SIDS

Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are a group of 39 states and 18 Associate Members of the United Nations regional commissions located across the Caribbean, the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea (AIS) regions (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, n.d.). They are highly affected by climate change, making them vulnerable to climate shocks and natural disasters. The majority of the 18 SIDS in the Indo-Pacific are facing some level of debt risk, and 11 of the 18 countries are in critical risk categories, as per the latest debt sustainability analysis conducted by the IMF and the World Bank (Mani, 2025).

Across Thailand’s major river systems, a consistent pattern becomes evident. Provinces intersected by river systems or along the coast, like Sing Buri, Lop Buri, Chachoengsao, and Samut Songkhram (Figure 2), often have trouble managing waste. In these areas, 83% to 87% of waste is mismanaged and leakage rates are as high as 8-10%. This is not a coincidence. As Jambeck et al. (2015) note, mismanaged land-based waste is a dominant pathway for plastics to enter rivers, travel downstream, and ultimately accumulate in marine environments. Along these waterways, rivers become conveyors of local failures, turning inland waste into coastal and oceanic pollution.

What makes the Maldives’ case critical is the scale and speed at which the situation is escalating. It is one of the worst affected by climate change, with mounting debts, increased reliance on external financial support, and external pressure due to competition between India and China for sea power in the Indian Ocean. The present situation in the Maldives provides a clear example for other SIDS as geopolitical interest in climate-vulnerable regions continues to grow.

Conclusion

The country is struggling for environmental survival and sovereignty as it stands at the intersection of two defining challenges of the twenty-first century: climate change and geopolitical competition. This scenario has complicated its foreign policy and governance landscape. Addressing this dual challenge will require sustained international climate finance, which the government rightly uses; a strong regional organization that serves the interests of Indian Ocean island states and becomes their voice on the world stage; and strategies that enable the Maldives to pursue development and adaptation without sacrificing strategic autonomy. The Maldives serves as a compelling example of the challenges confronting SIDS today. Understanding their predicament through this dual lens is crucial for building more equitable and resilient regional and global responses.

^{Suggested citation:
Malik, Vrinda (2026, January). “Double Trouble for the Maldives: Caught between Rising Seas and Rising Powers.” Trends in Peace and Sustainability 3(2): 1–5. <URL> Access date.}

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